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REMOVAL TO ADMIRALTY*
IN a series of recent west-coast cases,' defendants have attempted to remove
maritime actions properly initiated in state court to the admiralty side of fed-
eral court, and thus defeat the plaintiffs' historic right to a common-law
forum. The right to try a maritime claim at law in state court stems from the
duality of maritime jurisdiction created by section 9 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 2 which provides that the federal district courts have "exclusive original
cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.... sav-
ing to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy where the com-
mon law is competent to give it. . . ."8 Pursuant to the initial clause of this
*Scurlock v. American President Lines, Ltd., 162 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Cal. 1958) ; Craw-
ford v. East Asiatic Co., 156 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1957); Davis v. Matson Nay. Co.,
143 F. Supp. 537 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
1. Scurlock v. American President Lines, Ltd., 162 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Cal. 1958);
Fred. Olsen & Co. v. Moore, 162 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Cal. 1958); Eriksen v. Moore Mill &
Lumber Co., 157 F. Supp. 888 (D. Ore. 1958) ; Crawford v. East Asiatic Co., 156 F. Supp.
571 (N.D. Cal. 1957) ; Hill v. United Fruit Co., 149 F. Supp. 470 (S.D. Cal. 1957) ; Davis
v. Matson Nay. Co., 143 F. Supp. 537 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
2. Judiciary Act § 9, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 76 (1789). This statute implemented the constitu-
tional grant extending judicial power to the United States over "all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. While very little is known concerning
the development of the maritime grant by the Constitutional Convention, the most generally
accepted theory is that it was added near the end of the work of the Committee on Detail
and was accepted by the Convention with little discussion. See ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 8
(1939) [hereinafter cited as ROBINSON] ; Putnam, Howp the Federal Courts Were Given
Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 460, 469 (1925). But see Waring v. Clarke, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 441, 457 (1847). Whatever the source of the constitutional provision, the
granting of this power to the federal judiciary was not seriously challenged. See Till,
FEDERALIST No. 80, at 446 (Hallowell ed. 1826) (Hamilton); FRANKFURTER & LANDIS,
TiaE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME CouRT 7-8 & nn.13-14 (1927). Federal courts have exer-
cised wide jurisdiction over maritime affairs pursuant to this constitutional grant as im-
plemented by the Judiciary Act. See De Lovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1815) ; GILMOE & BLAcK, ADMIRALTY 18-20 (1957) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE
& BLAcK]. See generally SPRAGUE, The Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction and the
Growth of Substantive Maritime Law in the United States Since 1835, in 3 LAw, A CEN-
TURY OF PROGRESS 294 (1937). Furthermore, Congress seized upon the constitutional grant
as the basis for enacting substantive maritime legislation, and its authority to do so has
been upheld by the Supreme Court. Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924) ; South-
ern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (191.7); see GILMORE & BLACx 42; Rofixsox 9. For
a general history of the development and nature of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in
the United States see GILMORE & BLAcK 18-47; Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique
and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 259 (1950).
3. Judiciary Act § 9, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 76 (1789). The wording of the "saving to suitors"
clause was altered when the Judiciary Code was revised in 1948. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333
(1958). It now reads: "... . saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they
are otherwise entitled." This is merely a change in phraseology, however, which does not
substantially affect the meaning of the saving clause. Reviser's Note following 28 U.S.C.
§ 1333 (1958); New York Cent. R.R. v. Rodermond Indus., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 435, 436 n.1
(D.N.J. 1953); see GiLuoRE & BLACK 35 & n.130; Black, supra note 2, at 270-72.
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grant, federal admiralty jurisdiction is exercised on the admiralty side of the
district courts, with a separate docket 4 and procedure.5 Courts have inter-
preted the second, or "saving," clause to mean that a plaintiff has the right
to try those marine claims which may be remedied outside of admiralty in a
common-law forum 6 according to the procedures there followed.7 A maritime
plaintiff with a saving-clause action thus can sue in admiralty, in state court,
or, if he can meet the jurisdictional requirements, on the law side of federal
court s
Interpretation of the phrase "common law remedy" to mean trial in a com-
mon-law forum affords the maritime plaintiff in most instances the right to
a jury.9 Although a maritime plaintiff's choice between a state or federal law
4. Gnmmoan & BLACK 30.
5. The Rules of Practice in Admiralty and Maritime Cases are found in 28 U.S.C.
app., at 5222 (1958 ed.). See generally 1 BENEDIcr, AomirmL'rT 301-17 (5th ed. 1925).
The Admiralty Rules are designed to provide an expeditious adjudication and are inter-
preted with great liberality in order to provide a simple, nontechnical procedure aimed at
doing substantial justice. See Dowling v. Isthmian S.S. Corp., 184 F.2d 758, 777-78 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 935 (1950); Ancich v. The Marsha Ann, 92 r. Supp. 929,
932-33 (S.D. Cal. 1950) ; New York Surplus & Jobbing Corp. v. S.S. Andrew Jackson, 90
F. Supp. 959, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Some of the rules are directed to problems peculiar
to maritime affairs, e.g., in rem actions, limitation of liability petitions, salvagc, while others
involve subjects of a more general nature, such as the taking of evidence, appeals, and pre-
trial procedure. While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to suits in ad-
miralty, FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a); Miller v. Standard Oil Co., 104 F. Supp. 946, 949 (N.D.
Ill.), aff'd, 199 F.7d 457 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 945 (1953), where an ad-
miralty rule and a civil procedure rule are identical, they are entitled to the same construc-
tion, The Cristina, 35 F. Supp. 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).
6. See Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Mach. Co., 237 U.S. 303 (1915); Knapp,
Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1900) ; Leon v. Galceran, 78 U.S. (11 \Wall.)
185 (1870).
7. The maritime plaintiff relying on the saving clause for jurisdiction institutes an
ordinary civil action in a "common law" court. See Gn.moR & BLAcK 33. The case there-
fore is subject to the civil procedures of the trial forum. Otis v. State, 176 Misc. 3S9, 397,
27 N.Y.S2d 527, 536 (Ct. Cl. 1941) ; see FED. R. Crv. P. 1.
8. See GILmREo & BLACK 33; RoBINsoN 23 & n.20. Since an action arising under the
general maritime law does not "arise under" the Constitution or laws of the United States
for purposes of determining jurisdiction, Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U.S. 354 (1959), the federal district courts do not have original jurisdiction of such
actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958), which gives the district courts original jurisdiction
of civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. There-
fore federal jurisdiction over maritime suits on the law side of the district court would be
restricted to those actions in which diversity of citizenship exists and at least $10,000 is in
controversy, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958), or suits under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958), which gives
the district courts original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any act of Congress
regulating commerce, see Crispin Co. v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 134 F. Supp. 704 (S.D.
Te. 1955) (Carriage of Goods by Sea Act).
9. See Williams v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 227 F.2d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 1955);
Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F2d 834, 846 (1st Cir. 1952) ; Black, supra note 2, at 268.
"Common law remedy" does not, however, restrict plaintiffs to those forms of relief
traditionally available in common-law courts, as distinguished from chancery. Equitable
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court may depend on a variety of factors,10 usually he would choose law over
admiralty to -have a jury trial,' especially in personal injury cases.12 By re-
moving to admiralty, a defendant seeks to avoid the potentially sympathetic
reception of a plaintiff's claim by a jury.13
Removal is provided for in section 1441 of the Judicial iCode, which reads
in part:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any
civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defend-
ant or defendants, to the district court of the United States ...
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts 'have original jurisdiction
remedies are included in the statutory phrase "common law remedy." See Red Cross Line
v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924) (specific enforcement of arbitration agreement)
Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1900) (equitable enforcement of a lien);
Kellum v. Emerson, 14 Fed. Cas. 263 (No. 7669) (C.C.D. Mass. 1854) (accounting of
earnings). Another view is that since the admiralty court never had equitable jurisdiction,
this need not be "saved" from its exclusive cognizance by the "saving to suitors" clause.
Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co., 265 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1959). If the plaintiff seeks
equitable relief he does not ordinarily have the right to trial before a jury. See, e.g., Black
v. Boyd, 248 F.2d 156, 161-62 (6th Cir. 1957) ; Jamaica Say. Bank v. M. S. Investing Co.,
274 N.Y. 215, 221, 8 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1937).
10. While ordinarily all courts must apply the general maritime law, Southern Pac.
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (191.7), the plaintiff may feel that the federal district court
will be more in tune with the exact interpretations of the law as applied in admiralty and
thus he will choose the federal rather than state law forum. Also, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure may have some appeal to the plaintiff. On the other hand, in those cases
where the jurisdictional requirements of the federal law courts can not be met, the state
court is the only law forum available. Other factors which may influence a plaintiff to have
his cause tried in a state rather than a federal law court are the possible convenience of
the former, Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 563 (1954), and, in those limited
maritime areas where state substantive law governs, see GILMO E & BLACK 43-46, the
familiarity of the state tribunal with this law, Madruga v. Superior Court, supra at 563.
11. See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, at 23-24 (1932) ; 6 FRuziER & BFNoIT, PERSONAL INJURY Seameln
§ 1.06, at 18 (1959). The maritime plaintiff may also prefer a "common law" forum in
order to obtain equitable relief. See note 9 supra. While it is often said that admiralty is
governed by equitable principles, e.g., Rainey v. New York & P.S.S. Co., 216 Fed. 449, 452
(9th Cir. 1914), the admiralty court does not possess the distinctive remedial powers of a
court of equity, see The Eclipse, 135 U.S. 599, 608 (1890). If the cause is wholly maritime
and the equitable claim is "incidental" to the action, however, the admiralty court may as-
sume jurisdiction of the case and grant comprehensive relief. See Swift & Co. Packers v.
Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684, 690-92 (1950) ; The Emma B., 140
Fed. 771 (D.N.J. 1906) ; Comment, 29 TEXAS L. REv. 244, 246 (1950).
12. See GILmORE & BLACK 688.
13. Trial in admiralty, following civil-law tradition, is to a judge. GnLmOio & BLAcK
31. Actions in admiralty were specifically excluded in the section of the Judiciary Act of
1789 providing for jury trial in the district courts. Judiciary Act § 9, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 77
(1789). The one exception to the generalization that a jury trial is not available in ad-
miralty arises in actions involving commerce on the Great Lakes, in which a jury trial is




founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or
laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizen-
ship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable
only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as de-
fendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.1 4
By gearing this statute to the district courts' original jurisdiction,15 but failing
expressly to include or exclude admiralty jurisdiction, Congress obscured the
precise relationship between section 1441 and the saving clause. Section 1441
removal of a maritime action from a state court to the law side of federal court
would not affect a plaintiff's saving-clause rights.10 But such a case-Crispin
Co. v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co.' 7 -- was the foundation for subsequent attempts
to remove to admiralty. There, since the action arose under federal statute
(the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act),18 the district court had original juris-
diction ' 9 and therefore removal jurisdiction under section 1441(a). On motion
for remand,20 plaintiff contended that the saving clause, in affording recourse
to the state courts, was a grant of exclusive jurisdiction which prevented re-
moval of this action.21 Denying remand,2" the court ruled that the saving clause
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958).
15. See Moopz, COMIMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDIcIAL CODE ff 0.03(31), at 220 (1949).
16. Removal from a state court to the "law" side of the district court has been allowed
in numerous cases. See, e.g., Noorollah Bakhshandeh V. Continental Ins. Co., 129 F. Supp.
122 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Compania Maritima Ador, S4A. v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co.,
120 F. Supp. 577 (S.D:N.Y. 1954).
17. 134 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Tex. 1955).
18. 49 Stat. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1952) [hereinafter cited as COGSA].
COGSA generally governs the liabilities and immunities of an issuer of an ocean bill of
lading, but does not specify any particular court in which its terms may be enforced. See
generally Gn:moRE & BLACK 87-169.
19. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceed-
ing arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1337
(1958).
20. Under federal practice, a case is "removed" from the state court to the district
court on the filing in that court by defendant of a verified petition containing a statement
of the facts which entitle him to remove and the posting of bond to cover costs in the event
the removal is found to be improper. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1958). In order to challenge the
defendant's right to remove, the plaintiff files a motion for remand with the district court.
28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1958). See generally Mfooma, op. cit. Lupra note 15, ff 0.03(42) ; Brovn,
Re mval Procedure Under the Re-i.scd Judicial Code, 19 U. Circ. L. REV. 171 (1950).
21. The plaintiff did not claim that the saving clause was an absolute bar to removal.
He conceded that if diversity of citizenship and the requisite jurisdictional amount were
present the action could be removed. 134 F. Supp. at 707. Although it is not clear from
the opinion, the plaintiff apparently opposed removal on the ground that the action arose
under the general maritime law and therefore presented no basis for original federal juris-
diction, see note 33 infra, and hence no removal jurisdiction. The court jettisoned this
theory when it found that the action was brought under COGSA and thus the federal
courts had jurisdiction. See note 19 supra.
22. The court first ordered the case remanded to the state court. The defendant sub-
sequently filed a motion for reconsideration and the court, "on more mature consideration,"
withdrew its earlier order and found that the removal was proper. 134 F. Supp. at 705.
1960]
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affords maritime plaintiffs a choice of remedy, not of forum ;23 and, since the
same common-law remedies were available on the law side of the district court,
state court jurisdiction was not exclusive. 24 The court interpreted subsections
(a) and (b) of section 1441 as independent grounds for removal and allowed
removal under the general language of the former.25
The rationale of Crispin was heavily relied upon by the Northern District
of California in Davis v. Matson Nay. Co.,20 a suit for negligence and unsea-
worthiness brought by a longshoreman in state court but removed to admiral-
ty.27 Since the action was based on general maritime law and therefore with-
in the original admiralty jurisdiction of the district court, defendant claimed
it was removable under 1441(a). In denying remand, the court interpreted
subsection 1441 (a) as a distinct and broad ground for removal, requiring only
23. The object of the saving clause was to limit the exclusive jurisdiction of the ad-
miralty court by preserving plaintiff's choice between law and admiralty. The Belfast, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 624, 644 (1868). The maritime plaintiff with a saving clause action thus
is guaranteed the choice of instituting his case in either admiralty or a common-law forum,
but is not guaranteed the right to maintain it in any particular law forum. Wunderlich v.
Netherlands Ins. Co., 125 F. Supp. 877, 880-81 & n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
24. 134 F. Supp. at 707.
25. Id. at 705.
26. 143 F. Supp. 537 (N.D. Cal: 1956), 10 STAN. L. REv. 168 (1957).
27. In two previous cases which seemingly involve such removal of a saving-clause
action from a state court to admiralty, Berton v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Dock Co., 219 Fed.
763 (D.N.J. 1915); New York Cent. R.R. v. Rodermond Indus., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 435
(D.N.J. 1953), the respective courts failed to state clearly whether the defendants petitioned
for removal to the law or admiralty side of the district court. In Berton the statement of
jurisdiction preceding the opinion refers to the action as one "At Law" and addresses the
parties as "plaintiff" and "defendant," 219 Fed. at 764, whereas if the removal were to
admiralty the jurisdictional statement should have read "In Admiralty," see The Julia
Luckenbach, 219 Fed. 600 (E.D. Va. 1914), and the parties would properly be referred to
as "libellant" and "respondent" respectively, GILmoRE & BLACK 30-31. On the other hand,
the ground for removal was that the suit arose under the laws of the United States and
was of admiralty jurisdiction. 219 Fed. at 765. The court granted the petition for remand
on the finding that the action arose under the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act,
not under any theory of maritime contract or tort and, since the admiralty court did not
have exclusive jurisdiction of such actions, the plaintiff's initial choice of remedy should
prevail. 219 Fed. at 770-71. That the suit was removed to the admiralty side of the court
is suggested, first, by the language of the removal petition itself, and, second, by the fact
that otherwise there would seem to be no reason for the court to consider whether admiral-
ty had jurisdiction of this action to the exclusion of state courts and likewise no basis for
a statement that remand protected the plaintiff's choice of remedy. New York Central in-
volved the question of whether the action arose under general maritime or state law for
purposes of ascertaining removal jurisdiction under § 1441(b) of the Judicial Code. 113
F. Supp. at 436. Although the court never mentions whether the removal is to law or ad-
miralty and refers to the parties as "plaintiff" and "defendant," the fact that the order to
remand was based on the saving clause of § 1333 implies that the action was removed to
admiralty. Neither of these cases nor their reasoning is referred to in the west-coast cases
under consideration. See cases cited note 1 mtpra.
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that the federal district court have original jurisdiction of the action.m In an-
swer to the plaintiff's claim that the saving clause prevented removal, the court
cited Crispin's dichotomy between choice of remedy and choice of forum with-
out examination of whether the state court's "remedies" were available in the
admiralty court.29 With no apparent awareness of the nature of its holding, the
court thus allowed the defendant to deny plaintiff his traditional right to have
his cause tried in a common-law court before a common-law jury.
But one year later, belatedly recognizing the effect of removal to admiralty,
the Northern District "reconsidered carefully" the proper relationship be-
tween the federal removal statute and the saving clause. Crawford v. East
Asiatic Co.,30 a case involving substantially the same factual situation as Mat-
son, reaffirmed the earlier holding that the saving clause does not lodge ex-
clusive jurisdiction in the state court, but modified Matson by holding that
subsections (a) and (b) of section 1441 are functionally interrelated.3 ' Thus,
subsection (a), which gears removal to original federal jurisdiction, is limited
by the precise conditions for removal set forth in subsection (b). To remove,
therefore, defendant had to show, under subsection (a), that the district court
had original jurisdiction and, under subsection (b), either that none of the
parties properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the state in
which the action is brought or, that the action is founded on a claim or right
arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States.32 Because
the claim in Crawford arose under the general maritime law, the federal ad-
miralty court had original jurisdiction as required by subsection (a). The de-
fendant was unable to fulfill the requirements of subsection (b), however,
because it was a corporate citizen of the forum state, and the court, following
28. 143 F. Supp. at 538-39; ef. Nyberg v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 123 F. Supp. 599,
602-03 (W.D. Mich. 1954).
29. 143 F. Supp. at 538.
30. 156 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
31. Id. at 572-73.
32. This view is adopted by the majority of court decisions interpreting § 1441. See,
e.g., Monroe v. United Carbon Co., 196 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Eriksen v. Moore Mill
& Lumber Co., 157 F. Supp. 888 (D. Ore. 1958); Marshall v. Navco, Inc., 152 F. Supp.
50, 54 & n.5 (S.D. Tex. 1957) ; Irvin Jacobs & Co. v. Levin, 86 F. Supp. 850 (N.D. Ohio
1949), aff'd, 180 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1950). Furthermore, legislative history indicates that
Congress enacted § 1441 to clarify federal removal jurisdiction without materially chang-
ing its scope. Reviser's Note following 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958) ; Moonz, op. cit. mipra note
15, 1 0.03(30). If subsection (a) were read separately, it would allow actions to be re-
moved which could not have been removed under the former removal provision, Judiciary
Act of 1911, ch. 231, § 28, 36 Stat. 1094, and thus would substantially e.'-pand federal re-
moval jurisdiction, see Eriksen v. Moore Mill & Lumber Co., supra at 890 & n.l. Inter-
preting subsection (b) to afford an independent ground for removal would devitalize the
provision in subsection (a) which denies removal when expressly prohibited by an act of
Congress. Defendant could simply resort to subsection (b), which contains no such pro-
hibition. See id. at 890 & n2. Indeed, if read separately, § 1441(b) would allow actions to
be removed to the federal courts which could not have appeared there originally. To re-
move under subsection (b), defendant must show only that no defendant is a citizen of the
state in which the action is brought, but need not show that there is diversity among the
parties.
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the then majority view,as denied that an action arising under the general mari-
time law "arises under" the 'Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United
States.3 4 Since the defendant was unable to meet either of the requirements
of subsection (b), the action was remanded for trial in the state court. In re-
manding, the Crawford court noted that its interpretation of the federal re-
moval statute protected the common-law remedy afforded the plaintiff under
the "saving to suitors" clause."3
33. Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha, 221 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1955); Jor-
dine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1950). Contra, Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834
(1st Cir. 1.952) ; see Jansson v. Swedish Am. Line, 185 F.2d 212, 217-18 (1st Cir. 1950).
The conflict among the circuits was resolved, subsequent to Crawford, by Romero v. In-
ternational Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) (5-4 decision), which held that
the grant of jurisdiction over "suits of a civil nature . . . arising under the Constitution or
laws of the United States," in article III of the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 en-
compassed a separate and distinct class of cases from those "Cases of admiralty and mari-
time Jurisdiction," over which the federal courts were given jurisdiction by article III of
the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1333. 358 U.S. at 364-68; see American Ins. Co. v. Canter,
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 544-46 (1828). But see 358 U.S. at 399-405 (dissenting opinion of
Brennan, 3.) ; 8 STAN. L. REv. 129, 133-34 (1955). Therefore an action in which relief Is
claimed under the general maritime law is automatically excluded from consideration by a
federal court when federal jurisdiction is based on the contention that the case "arises
under" the Constitution or laws of the United States. To hold otherwise, noted the Court,
would take away "the historic option of a maritime suitor pursuing a common-law remedy
to select his forum, state or federal . . . ." 358 U.S. at 371, This would be so since defend-
ants could then freely remove saving clause actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co., 265 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1959), criticized in The
Supreme Court: 1958 Term, 73 HARv. L. REv. 126, 141 (1959), was an action seeking in-
junctive relief brought in federal district court on the ground that it was a case "arising
under" the laws of the United States. The court recognized the Roinero doctrine, but dis-
tinguished the instant case by holding that, although it arose out of a maritime fact situa-
tion, it was not a saving-clause action because the admiralty court never had jurisdiction
over equity cases and thus there was nothing to "save" from their exclusive jurisdiction.
Therefore, in terms of the Romero distinction, the court held that, for purposes of juris-
diction, an injunctive suit involving maritime subject-matter is not a "case of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction" but is a suit "of a civil nature . . . in equity" arising because
of the "breach of a federal duty." Panama would afford the opportunity for removal of
any action involving a request for equitable relief based on maritime subject-matter by
holding that such actions "arise under" the federal law but are not saving clause cases sub-
ject to Romero's limitation. The doctrine of Panana, if widely accepted and applied to all
maritime actions claiming equitable relief, will automatically afford the plaintiff who call
claim equitable relief the opportunity to have his cause heard on the "civil side" of the
federal district court, whereas if he brings the same action at law he will generally be able
to meet the jurisdictional requirements of the federal court only if diversity of citizenship
exists. The doctrine would also guarantee the success of defendant's petition for removal
of a saving-clause action seeking equitable relief, since original federal jurisdiction is pres-
ent and the action arises under the laws of the United States.
34. 156 F. Supp. at 572-73.
35. Id. at 573. A similar restricted interpretation of § 1441 was adopted by the Oregon
District to prevent removal to admiralty. Eriksen v. Moore Mill & Lumber Co., 157 F.
Supp. 888 (D. Ore. 1958).
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The interpretation of section 1441 adopted in Crawford, although an effec-
tive device for plaintiff protection in that case, does not offer a comprehensive
solution to the problems arising from application of the removal statute to
saving clause cases in general. Although Crawford prevents the defendant
from removing a saving clause action arising under general maritime law
when the sole ground for removal is admiralty or federal question jurisdic-
tion, it does not prevent removal when there is complete diversity among the
suitors and none of the defendants are citizens of the forum state. The court
implied in dictum, however, that should the latter situation arise, removal
would be confined to the law side of the district court, where plaintiff could
be afforded his saving-clause remedies. 30 This dictum evidences an awareness
of the real issue presented by an attempt to remove a saving-clause action to
admiralty. But if the court meant that the absence of common-law procedures
in the admiralty court is sufficient ground for denial of removal, it should
logically have held that no saving-clause action can be removed to admiralty.37
Such a holding would have solved the court's immediate problem and rendered
unnecessary its essentially tangential discussion of section 1441. Thus Craw-
ford ignored a direct and logical solution to its problem and concentrated in-
stead on an involved and technical process of statutory interpretation.
The question left unanswered by Crawford-removal of a saving-clause
action in which diversity among the parties exists and none of the defendants
is a citizen of the forum state-was presented to the same court one year later
in Scurlock v. American President Lines, Ltd.38 In Scurlock a noncitizen
defendant attempted to remove from the state to the admiralty court. Instead
of asldng for remand, plaintiff moved for transfer to the law docket. The court
stated that plaintiff was powerless to resist removal to admiralty, but none-
theless transferred the action to law.39 In the past, exercise of the discretionary
power of transfer has normally been preceded by a holding that admiralty was
without jurisdiction of an action originally filed there.40 The alternative to
transfer, therefore, is ordinarily dismissal. In either case the plaintiff is not
denied his right to a common-law forum since dismissal does not bar a sub-
sequent suit in state court. In Scurldck, however, the court acknowledged ad-
miralty jurisdiction in the first instance. It was faced, therefore, not with the
36. 156 F. Supp. at 573.
37. Hill v. United Fruit Co., 149 F. Supp. 470 (S.D. Cal. 1957), concluded that re-
moval to admiralty was not permissible under 1441 (a).
38. 162 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
39. Id. at 82. The courts in numerous cases have allowed transfer between the ad-
miralty and law sides of the district court. See, e.g., McAfoos v. Canadian Pac. S.Ss., Ltd.,
243 F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957); Civil v. \Vaterman S.S.
Corp., 217 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Petrol Corp. v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co., 162
F.2d 327, 330 (2d Cir. 1947).
40. See, e.g., Admiral Oriental Line v. United States, 86 F.2d 201, 203-04 (2d Cir.
1.936) ; Prince Line, Ltd. v. American Paper Exports, Inc., 55 F.2d 1053, 1056-57 (2d Cir.
1932). But see Jackson v. Ore Nay. Corp., 159 F. Supp. 935 (D. Md. 1958) ; Nilssun v.
American Oil Co., 118 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Tex. 1954).
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choice between transfer and dismissal, but transfer and retention of jurisdic-
tion. Under such circumstances, if the court failed to exercise its discretion to
transfer, trial would proceed in admiralty and plaintiff would be denied a jury.
Thus Scurlock rested protection of the maritime plaintiff's right to a common-
law proceeding solely on the discretionary power of transfer-an uncertain
safeguard for general application. The court should have done what Crauford
refused to do--overrule Matson by holding that admiralty has no removal
jurisdiction.
A court would have more than ample grounds for holding that section 1441
does not apply to removal of saving-clause actions to admiralty. Since legis-
lative history nowhere indicates that Congress anticipated conflict between
the two statutes, it would be well within judicial power to infer that, in the
absence of an express provision, Congress did not intend the general removal
statute to nullify the right so clearly preserved in the saving clause. In the
words of the Southern District of California, when faced with removal to
admiralty, "only by permitting impeccable logic to overrule inexorable his-
tory can the doctrine of repeal by implication ...be held to require such a
result .. ."41 The fact that Congress has prevented removal of personal injury
maritime actions brought under the Jones Act buttresses this conclusion. 42
And the Supreme Court has, in another context, protected the personal injury
maritime plaintiff's right to a common law trial. Ordinarily, if a maritime
action initiated in a state or federal law court is within the Limitation of Lia-
bility Act,43 the defendant can have the case transferred to admiralty44 if he
41. Hill v. United Fruit Co., 149 F. Supp. 470, 473 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
42. "Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment
may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right to trial by jury,
and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common-
law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply." Jones
Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952). The incorporation into the Jones Act
of statutes extending or modifying the rights or remedies of railway employees had the
effect of adopting into the act the Federal Employers' Liability Act [FELAl, 35 Stat. 65
(1908), as amended, 36 Stat. 291 (1910), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952). See
Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1924). FELA contained an express pro-
hibition of removal of actions from state to federal courts. While this prohibition clause
was dropped from FELA in 1948, it was retained in § 1445 (a) of the Judicial Code. 28
U.S.C. § 1445(a) (1958). It was argued that the prohibition of removal no longer applied
to Jones Act cases since it was no longer incorporated in FELA, but this argument was
rejected by the courts. Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., 193 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1952).
The congressional policy of nonremoval of maritime actions from state courts expressed
in the Jones Act, see Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 371
& n.29 (1959), would seem particularly applicable when the removal is to the admiralty
court, where the plaintiff loses his right to a jury trial.
43. Rav. STAT. §§ 4281-89 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1952).
44. Although the act itself does not specify a particular court in which the limitation
proceedings are to be brought, the Supreme Court recognized at an early date that the
admiralty court was the obvious forum in which to hear limitation actions, Norwich Co.
v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 123-26 (1871), and the Admiralty Rules have always
so provided, ADMIRALTY R. 54; see GiLmORE & BLAcx 671.
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files a petition for limitation and deposits security equal to the value of the
ship and freight.45 The Supreme Court, however, has protected the maritime
plaintiff in a personal injury action by denying transfer despite the defendant's
apparent right to transfer under the literal wording of the act.40
The federal courts can and should protect the plaintiff's right to a common-
law forum by holding categorically that the admiralty court does not have juris-
diction for purposes of removal 7 A court seeking a doctrinal peg for such a
holding might rule that a suit in admiralty is not a "civil action" as contem-
plated in 1441,48 and that an action must be "civil" in both forums to be re-
movable.49 But the Northern District of ,California's reluctance, revealed in
Crawford and Scurlock, to hold saving-clause action nonremovable indicates
that Congress may be the most appropriate source of protection. An amend-
ment to section 1441 should state that, unless otherwise expressly provided
by act of Congress,5 0 maritime actions properly initiated in the state court
cannot be removed to admiralty. Such an amendment would be a simple yet
effective way of preserving for the maritime plaintiff the right of jury trial
which has traditionally been his.
45. Rev. STAT. § 4285 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1952); ADMIRALTY R. 51
46. Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931) ; Ex pare Green, 236 U.S. 437 (1932). See
generally GImoR & BLACK 672-95. In effect the Green cases held that a single-claim
plaintiff could, under certain conditions, prosecute a personal injury action in a common-
law court without being subject to transfer to admiralty by defendant's limitation petition.
Lower courts, working under the principle of the Green cases, have allowed the plaintiff
to continue in a common-law court after defendant files a limitation petition if he: files a
claim in the limitation proceeding; agrees to the stipulated value of the ship and cargo;
waives any defense of res judicata on relevant limitation issues decided in the state court;
concedes the shipowner's right to litigate all issues relating to limitation in a limitation
proceeding if the state court judgment should exceed the stipulated worth of the owner's
interest in the ship and freight. See Petition of Red Star Barge Line, Inc., 160 F2d 436
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 850 (1947); George J. Waldie Towing Co. v. Ricca, 227
F2d 900 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Matter of Lake Tankers Corp., 232 F.Zd 573 (2d Cir. 1956) ;
GilroRE & Br-AcK 694-95. In the course of its opinion in Langnes v. Green, itpra at 543,
the Court quoted The Lotta, 150 Fed. 219, 223 (D.S.C. 1907) :
"if.. . petitioner's [owner's] object in invoking the jurisdiction of this court is to
escape a jury trial and take the case away from the common-law jurisdiction, that
purpose should receive no countenance here; for the act which gives this court its
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction saves to suitors in all cases the right of the
common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it, and good faith
requires that this proviso shall have its full and fair effect."
47. It is settled that in cases where doubt exists as to the jurisdiction of the removal
forum, the cause should be remanded to the state court. See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R.
v. Roderniond Indus., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 435 (D.N.J. 1953) ; Demer v. Pacific S.S. Co.,
273 Fed. 567 (W.D. Wash. 1921).
48. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 1, 81(a).
49. See text at note 14 supra.
50. This would prevent any conflict with the Limitation of Liability Act, if it should
be contended that transfer under this act constitutes "removal."
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